

Nanopublication – Responsible for the Conditions, Not the Uptake: Pragmatics' Accountability Debate Meets the Ethical Center – but Pragmatics Still Wants Convergence

by Arnaud Quercy

The line runs between responsibility-for-conditions, which the source affirms in almost the framework's own terms (P31), and responsibility-for-outcomes-as-correctness, which the entire pragmatic apparatus of defaults, cancellability, and deniability quietly assumes and which sits uneasily against a model that wants divergent reception treated as creation rather than error.

WHAT THE SOURCE SAYS [1]

This SEP entry surveys the many incompatible uses of 'default interpretation' in semantics and pragmatics – meanings conveyed automatically, saliently, or presumptively beyond the literal sentence (Grice's generalized implicatures, Levinson's presumptive meanings, Recanati's automatic enrichment, Jaszczolt's cognitive and socio-cultural defaults, computational nonmonotonic-logic defaults). It shows there is no single agreed 'default model': theories disagree on whether defaults are automatic or inferential, context-free or context-sensitive, cancellable or entrenched. Section 5 turns to accountability: given that speakers convey default/salient content they did not explicitly assert, what are they responsible for – minimal semantic content, or the standard interpretation a competent hearer would recover? The entry treats this through dogwhistles, figleaves, lying, and deniability, framing speaker meaning as a 'deontological' matter – obligations and responsibilities, not just truth-conditions.

WHERE THE LENS GRIPS

P31 (Ethical Center) grips cleanly against Section 5. Haugh's claim that speaker meaning is a deontological concept – accountability for 'social rights, obligations, responsibilities' beyond bare veracity – and the discussion of dogwhistles/figleaves (utterances engineered so that a default, socially loaded reading is available to a targeted audience while remaining deniable to others) map onto P31's structure almost point for point: the emitter does not control which hearer resolves

which reading, but is held responsible for having built an utterance whose construction made that reading available. 'The one who presses the button is responsible for the conditions that made it possible' finds a near-literal echo in Borg's and Dinges & Zakkou's analysis of deniability as an epistemic property the speaker either does or does not possess by design.

WHERE IT BREAKS

P17 (Multiplication of Creation) slips IF one reads the pragmatics apparatus as fundamentally oriented toward correcting divergence: cancellability, the 'fallacy of ignoring qualifications', deniability-as-failure, and lying/misleading are all treated in this literature as errors, manipulations, or miscommunications to be diagnosed against a standard, recoverable meaning – the opposite of P17's claim that any reception is 'equally legitimate' regardless of fidelity to intent. It holds – does not break – if one reads default/salient meaning as operating only at the physical, transmission layer (what a Model Addressee recovers), leaving P17's creative multiplication to occur one level further out, in what receivers subsequently do with that recovered content, a level this literature does not address. The article does not decide between these readings; it simply has no vocabulary for 'equally legitimate but different' creation, only for correct vs. defective recovery.

PROPOSITIONAL GRID [2]

Read this grid. "Not evaluated" does **not** mean the source has nothing to say about that proposition. It means **the reading did not instruct it**. That is not a result, and it counts in no denominator. A silence, by contrast, is a finding: the reading touched the proposition without concluding, or noted its absence itself.

Evaluated

proposi- tion		audit status	relational verdict
P17	Multiplication of Creation	not audited	pressure-against
P31	Ethical Center	not audited	evidence-for

Not evaluated (35) – P1, P2, P3, P3a, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P14a, P14b, P15, P16, P16a, P18, P18a, P19, P19a, P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26, P27, P28, P29, P30

Overall verdict: Bounded – taxonomy of the August 2026 pass, predating the move to relational verdicts. Kept as metadata: the gap between the two forms is data, not residue. This reading’s judgement is in the grid above.

Reading of 2026-07-01 · model claude-sonnet-5 · source 118,604 chars · 3 attempt(s)

FIRST PASS – KEPT AS WRITTEN

Reading produced by the T50 RSS pass, before the boundary lens. It is reproduced UNCORRECTED. Keeping it is the point: without it, a changed title is just a changed title – with it, what the second pass refused becomes legible.

Title it carried : « Defaults in Semantics: When Incomplete Signals Generate Meaning »

Jaszczolt's treatment of 'defaults' in meaning-making is a structural case of generative loss and overture-dependent reception. A default is precisely a gap – the speaker emits an incomplete signal (relying on contextual, cultural, or pragmatic defaults to fill the void), and the receiver's interpretive apparatus (their overture: training, context, embodied knowledge) completes the utterance. The meaning is not in the emission; it is generated in the diffraction through the receiver's codex of linguistic and social constraints. The multiplicity of approaches Jaszczolt identifies reflects the fact that there is no single 'correct' default – only the infinite variations produced when the same underdetermined signal passes through different interpretive overtures. This is not a bug in language; it is the engine of linguistic creation. The revised entry's attention to how defaults operate across semantic and pragmatic dimensions reveals that meaning-making is fundamentally a diffractive process, not a transmission of fixed content.

T50 RSS assessment · 2026-07-01 · remplacée par boundary-lens-2026-08

REFERENCES

[1] Defaults in Semantics and Pragmatics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026-07-01. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/defaults-semantics-pragmatics/>

[2] Quercy, A. (2026). The 31 Propositions of Ideamorphism. <https://ideamorphism.org/en/publications/2026/03/the-31-propositions-of-ideamorphism.html>

EPISTEMIC PROFILE

Claim type	boundary reading
Voice	third person analysis
Epistemic status	bounded grip
Methodology	Boundary-finding lens applied to one source, model claude-sonnet-5, 3 attempt(s), traceability check passed.

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