# Do animals think in language, images, or maps in their minds

**Artwork**:   
**Artist**: Arnaud Quercy  
**Asset**: IDS-RNI0279  
**Serial**: NAN-RDG000232

This is a Stanford Encyclopedia survey of philosophy-of-mind and comparative-cognition debates about whether non-human animals have thoughts, propositional content, and representational formats (language-like, iconic, map-like) — a question about the internal structure of animal minds, with no emitter, no artwork, no audience, and no act of emission or reception for the framework's apparatus (codex, wave, ouverture, diffraction, ricochet) to attach to.

## Context

### Declined — `no-purchase` [@source]

### Propositional grid [@p31]

> **Read this grid.** “Not evaluated” does **not** mean the source has nothing to say about that proposition. It means **the reading did not instruct it**. That is not a result, and it counts in no denominator. A silence, by contrast, is a finding: the reading touched the proposition without concluding, or noted its absence itself.

**Not evaluated (37)** — P1, P2, P3, P3a, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P14a, P14b, P15, P16, P16a, P17, P18, P18a, P19, P19a, P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26, P27, P28, P29, P30, P31

---

*Overall verdict: **DECLINED:no-purchase** — taxonomy of the August 2026 pass, predating the move to relational verdicts. Kept as metadata: the gap between the two forms is data, not residue. This reading’s judgement is in the grid above.*

Reading of 2026-09-25 · model `claude-sonnet-5` · source 124,120 chars · 1 attempt(s)