

Nanopublication – Two Haraways: this entry documents 'situated knowledges', not the diffraction Haraway the lens claims to borrow

by Arnaud Quercy

The line is which Haraway the framework means: this entry gives a precise, well-documented 'situated knowledges' Haraway whose own aim – partial connection and convergence across perspectives – sits in tension with the framework's divergence-oriented diffraction; it gives nothing at all on the later diffraction-as-method Haraway the framework more plausibly intends. Settling condition: does P25's cited 'pattern' derive from the 1988 essay, or from Haraway's post-1990s diffractive methodology (absent here)?

WHAT THE SOURCE SAYS [1]

The entry surveys feminist social epistemology: its critique of the atomistic, individualist knower; its development of situated, interactive and communal models of knowing; its debates over standpoint theory and 'strong objectivity'; and its more recent expansions into epistemic injustice, epistemologies of ignorance, and democratic structures of knowledge production. Within this, Donna Haraway's 1988 essay on 'situated knowledges' is presented as the source of an embodied, partial objectivity – knowledge as local and perspectival, with objectivity achieved through 'partial connection' and political solidarity across differently situated knowers, rather than through a view from nowhere.

WHERE THE LENS GRIPS

P25's constraint explicitly ties the framework's 'diffraction' to 'Haraway's pattern'. This entry is the documented, scholarly record of exactly that figure within her own field – her 1988 'situated knowledges' essay, discussed at length as the origin of embodied, partial objectivity in feminist epistemology.

WHERE IT BREAKS

The entry's account of Haraway never uses or mentions 'diffraction' as a concept; it stops at 'situated knowledges' and 'partial connection' (1988), and its bibliography includes neither her later diffractive-methodology writings nor Barad's uptake of the term. Whether this is a break depends on which Har-

away P25 means. It slips IF one reads P25's 'Haraway's pattern' as referring to the situated-knowledges essay this entry documents – because that essay's own logic (partial connection, translatability, convergence toward shared understanding across positions) pulls toward connection, not toward the framework's emphasis on divergence-without-transport. It holds (is simply silent, not refuted) IF 'Haraway's pattern' refers to her later, specifically optical use of 'diffraction' – a text this entry does not cover at all, making the entry irrelevant rather than contradictory.

PROPOSITIONAL GRID [2]

Read this grid. “Not evaluated” does **not** mean the source has nothing to say about that proposition. It means **the reading did not instruct it**. That is not a result, and it counts in no denominator. A silence, by contrast, is a finding: the reading touched the proposition without concluding, or noted its absence itself.

Evaluated

proposition		audit status	relational verdict
P25	Universal Diffraction	audited	open-question

What was instructed. These propositions have been judged and carry a current statement: it is **that** statement the reading tested, not the founding one.

- **P25** – judged in Note 06 · current statement : diffraction is an effect in the receiver; the series takes Haraway's pattern, not her practice; what arrives can have causes, depend on an activity, be learned and be changed afterwards without having been done; universal = no zero case, i.e. no reception without an interval from the emission

Not evaluated (36) – P1, P2, P3, P3a, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P14a, P14b, P15, P16, P16a, P17, P18, P18a, P19, P19a, P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, P26, P27, P28, P29, P30, P31

Overall verdict: Open – taxonomy of the August 2026 pass, predating the move to relational verdicts. Kept as metadata: the gap between the two forms is data, not residue. This reading's judgement is in the grid above.

Reading of 2026-10-17 · model claude-sonnet-5
· source 123,314 chars · 2 attempt(s)

REFERENCES

- [1] Feminist Social Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026-10-17. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-social-epistemology/>
- [2] Quercy, A. (2026). The 31 Propositions of Ideamorphism. <https://ideamorphism.org/en/publications/2026/03/the-31-propositions-of-ideamorphism.html>

EPISTEMIC PROFILE

Claim type	boundary reading
Voice	third person analysis
Epistemic status	undecided
Methodology	Boundary-finding lens applied to one source, model claude-sonnet-5, 2 attempt(s), traceability check passed.

CHECKSUM (SHA-256)

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